The Color Question

*I would like to apply my 4 point credit to last week's blog post please.*

I want to concentrate my post this week on section 5.2.1: Endogamy and the elements of ethics, particularly Taylor's discussion of the "conjugal expressiveness argument" which falls under the category of "strategic endogamy." Strategic endogamy, as Taylor defines it, entails an intentional choice to engage in conjugal relationships. One of the justifications for this practice is identified as the “conjugal expressiveness argument,” which claims that seeing a non-white person with a white partner will perpetuate white supremacist standards of beauty. However, Taylor claims the fifth chapter’s introductory “simple Story” demonstrates that JJ’s insecurity about dating Inga does not necessitate the absolute dominance of “somaesthetic white supremacy”—a psycho-physiological inclination towards white bodies; JJ questions whether his desire to date Inga may be problematic. The crux of problematizing the conjugal expressiveness argument is that “strategic endogamy targets the symptoms instead of the disease, in this case, colorist ideologies of bodily beauty.” Fair enough: emphasizing the individual preference of JJ overlooks the structural implications of somaesthetic white supremacy in the media, fashion industry, etc. Because JJ is, to be direct, of marginal importance in the public sphere compared to say, Jay-Z, then the significance of his choice for a partner is almost negligible (Taylor refers to this as the “role model corollary”). Here, I believe, Taylor offers a weak conclusion, which I will return to soon.
 

Taylor further delegitimizes the conjugal expressiveness argument based on the weakening of “our overall cultural inclination toward a pro-white somaesthetics.” Such instances that indicate its decline include Lucy Liu joining Charlie’s Angels, Black women winning Miss America, collagen-induced plumped lips, and tanning to darken the skin among others—a humorous example of the paradox that comedian Paul Mooney identifies: “everybody wants to be a nigger, but nobody wants to be a nigger.” To be fair, there has been a considerable presence on non-white bodies in historically white dominated industries. Now, what Taylor critically overlooks in his offering of the non-white presence in the celebrity and public sphere globally is the simultaneous reinforcement of pro-white somaesthetics. Famous examples include: (most notably) Michael Jackson, Sammy Sosa, Lil Kim, Nicki Minaj, etc. Skin bleaching creams abound not only outside the United States, but they have also gained popularity within the country as well. I raise these examples not necessarily to disagree with Taylor’s point that such forces are declining in their salience, but to qualify that their existence and perpetuation are real and have noteworthy consequences.

Returning to the relative insignificance of JJ’s desire to be with Inga, we are encountered with Taylor’s conclusion that JJ does not have a right to make a “color-conscious conjugal choice” despite the conjugal expressiveness argument. His solution: he should just have an honest conversation about with the children in his life about his decision. Admittedly, having open racial dialogue with children has proven to be significantly impactful (I am thinking in particular of Drexel Professor Dr. Yaba Blay’s public outreach to a 7 year old sent home from school for having dreadlocks: http://www.clutchmagonline.com/2013/09/tiana-care-package-full-locs-love/). However, if Taylor considers one who opts out of an interracial relationship because he does not want the children to experience the “special challenges” that accompany being bi-racial—which is a consideration of both internal and external ascription factors—permissible then should not a similar exception be granted to JJ’s case? Indeed, JJ’s angst partially refers to the psycho-social pressures of being in an interracial relationship. Does this invalidate the existence of interracial relationships? Of course not! It does, however, recognize that while one may not be ethically obligated to demonstrate color-conscious conjugal choices, the private relationships of “common people” are inextricably public as well. Perhaps not to the degree of Black Philadelphia native rapper, Eve, and her white husband Maximillion Cooper. But to sisters, nieces and nephews, and others he encounters in the street, JJ’s relationship bears racial symbolism, especially contingent on his social class. Although JJ may not be famous, his decision does indeed hold significant racial weight. 

What Races Are

*For the record, I think Taylor has occupied a decent (though not tremendously significant) amount of space talking about his inability to be able to talk about particular topics: just thought the irony was worth noting.*

"...claiming a racial identity may be the first step on a political journey: it may be the beginning or the product of a consciousness-raising experience (116)."

"White people can claim whiteness, people like Noel Ignatiev say, as a way of recognizing the racial privileges that they still enjoy, and as a first step toward disclaiming those privileges, all in the spirit of justice that animated radical abolitionists like John Brown (116)." 

I chose to highlight these particular passages because they illustrate what I perceived as a significant challenge, particularly to the white people in our class. (To clarify, I intentionally spell white with a lower case "w" in an attempt to practice a racial grammar that subverts the dominance of whiteness.) While reading this chapter, I kept wondering why white people felt compelled to join this class, especially those who are not majoring in Philosophy. Granted, this is a liberal arts institution that prides itself on the "diverse" mindsets of its students, who are supposed to be open to exploring fundamental questions about identity, etc. etc. But still the question remains: why this course? 

It is striking, as Taylor illuminates, how pervasively impactful race-thinking continues to be (especially in the United States) from the semantic attribution of meaning to bodies and bloodlines to the interrelated structural distribution of goods along such lines of racialized distinction. It may be noteworthy to speculate why others would intentionally join this class, but I do not have to room to engage in that sort of discussion*. Kidding. My following comments are primarily informed by commentary I have listened to in previous classes as well as reading the blog posts. (Someone could have joined the class because s/he/x is a Philosophy major and had to take a class...but this for my intention is insignificant.) One might join the class quite simply based on a desire to understand more about Race (What is it? Why do we talk about it so often? I have some experiences I think are based on race, could this be true?). Ostensibly simple enough. 

Perhaps someone may have been seeking out affirmation in their own preconceived notions about Race (Well, clearly I know what that is. But just to be sure...); it is a bit presumptuous and condescending, but also not of primary concern here. 

The case that warrants the most unpacking, I believe, is that of the person who chose to join this class perceiving that by doing so, s/he/x has affirmed something about her/him/x-self. Take for example comments such as, "I mean, I don't think any of us here is racist because...you know, other people on campus don't have the opportunity to take a course like this. (abridged from original)" or "I'm from X area, but I was actually going to go to X school because it has a minority dominant population. (altered from original)" These statements all have an underlying theme that sounds at best, steeped in evasion from guilt. I find these statements to be particularly problematic because they express an intentional effort to distance the speaker from being perceived as racist. Couple this with the fact that in a class with thirteen white people, only two were willing to identify themselves as racist, whereas, most were willing to admit to be recipients of structural advantages based on history. (I do not consider the non-white people in this comment because, as I stated, I disagree with Taylor’s frighteningly broad conceptualization of racism.) I note this to make this claim: aversion or refusal to accept that 1) one’s racial identity is informed by the semantic and structural forces of white supremacy and 2) the implications this produces is not working to challenge racism. Returning to the first cited quote from Taylor, actively claiming a racial identity (as well as its tragic and resilient history) is a decidedly political statement—one that may alter one’s self-understanding. So I end this with a challenge to the white people in class to openly, honestly grapple with accepting your racial identity.

**Note: no one is expecting you to raid a federal arsenal and try to bring the “new Jim Crow” to its knees as John Brown attempt; the vast majority of non-white people would not even consider such a feat.**

Three Challenges to Race-Thinking

I want to concentrate this blog primarily on section 2.2.1 of the second chapter and put Taylor's commentary in dialogue with my own from the previous class; Taylor raised a challenge to what he identified as the PPP (indicating racism = Privilege Plus Power) theorist, to which I will respond. Through the questions I have raised in the previous classes, I was hoping to point out that during our discussions we often encounter inconsistency in how we (those in our class) are defining particular terms. For that reason, I am focusing on the first sections of the chapter and returning to a definition I offered in class.

Three challenges to Race-thinking that Taylor considers here are: 1) Isn't race-thinking racist? (ethical inquiry); 2) Isn't racial biology false? (empirical inquiry); 3) Shouldn't the concept of race give way to notions like class? (conceptual inquiry) (28). He shortly thereafter follows the outline with this definition of racism: "an unethical disregard for people who belong to a particular group" (32), from which point he differentiates between extrinsic, intrinsic, and indirect racism. Finally, he offers five primary advantages for using "disregard" to operationalize his definition of racism, given that he admits it cursorily appears to be a rather "weak" term. They are: 1) "disregard" encompasses a broad range of attitudes simultaneously; 2) it maintains focus on ethical evaluation while focusing on the consequences of acts; 3) it also constructs a relationship between institutionalized racism and individual agency; 4) using "disregard" illuminates the moral and ethical impetus in evaluating racism; and 5) it clearly settles questions regarding exactly who/what can be construed as racist (33-4).

In considering certain theoretical positions on racism, Taylor raises a challenge to the PPP argument; those defining racism as the sum of privilege and power, he claims, are actually reductive in their definition of racism by severely narrowing the scope of what may (not) be considered racism. He cites the example of a non-white person that intentionally beats up white people, simply because they are white; Taylor defines this action as racist, however, admits that such actions have relatively low-impact on the spectrum of racism (the trans-Atlantic slave trade obviously occupying a high-impact position). Last class, in an attempt to establish more clarity about the definition of racism in response to Dr. Florka's inquiry (Who in this room is a racist?), I espoused the PPP argument. And admittedly, reading Taylor's critique challenged my thinking, although I am still unsure as to whether conceptualizing racism pluralistically is the most advantageous perspective. To buttress my uncertainty, I would raise the declining percentages recorded of explicit racism (although I do not know whether such data has changed since the election of Barack Obama) as a conceptual limitation to Taylor's understanding. Grouping hate crimes committed by non-white people, which perhaps may be a response, albeit unjustified, to oppression, on white people with the trans-Atlantic slave trade seems too convenient for Taylor's task of defining "Race-thinking." By that, I mean that both occurrences may be drastically different enough, in my opinion, to the extent that they each merit their own spectrum rather than an aggregate consolidation for the sake of conceptual clarity. That being said, at the very least I remain skeptical about Taylor's definition in regards to this contemporary period.

What Race-Thinking Is

"And second, as feminist scholars and other have pointed out for over a hundred years, and as my references to bodybuilding and the like show, human bodies are always already bearers of meaning" (Taylor 16-7)

When I read this quote, particularly the "always already" segment, it brought to mind the work of Judith Butler in relation to gender, but I know it's also associated with Heidegger and Derrida. Taylor elaborates on the idea that human bodies and the conditions in which they exist are "always already" defined by the "semantic" and "structural" racial projects that produce them (Taylor 24). I really appreciated this distinction because I think it brought to life the dual impact of race-talk/thinking in our everyday lives in that: 1) it informs how we conceptualize the world around us and 2) it is also informed by the conditions under which it has taken shape. There's an organization in Philadelphia that I'm affiliated with called "The Brothers' Network," which seeks to challenge dominant narratives about African American men through dialogue in arts and culture. One day, I was having a conversation with the founder and he made a statement that I think illustrates the two points about race talk/thinking; he said (something to the effect) that he could not imagine living a life in which he did not have to fight or struggle because of how tremendously impactful slavery and its aftermath have been. And it made me pause. Being told in each pre-dominantly white space I occupied that I did not fit the stereotypical mold of being Black; I'm "just different"; or I don't "act Black enough;" those times when I notice white salespeople following me around stores, regardless of my attire; and being told that it's good because I don't seem to angry, even though I talk about race. And all these instances are derived from the origins of Omi and Winant's concept of racial formation- "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed" (Taylor 24). I think a resounding point in this introduction is Taylor's emphasis on why engage race philosophically: precisely because as inhabitants of this country, our orientation to each other in a racialized society necessitates that we understand race although, like Zarita, we may not have the language to articulate our experience...just yet, that is.