The Rebirth of Caste

"Genuine equality for black people, King reasoned, demanded a radical restructuring of society, one that would address the needs of the black and white poor throughout the country" (39).

I want to begin with the premise that mass incarceration, or "not only the criminal justice system,  but  also...[a] larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that those labeled criminals both in and out of prison," as Alexander claims, is a serious issue in contemporary America (to say the least). By this point, we are well aware of Alexander's intent with this book: to prompt a large scale social movement geared towards halting the deplorable operation of institutions and practices that create a "racial caste" in this country. My purpose with this blog is simply to put a footnote in the subsequent discussions we will engage in. Mass incarceration is AN issue, but it is not THE issue. By this, I mean that we are working to combat systems and structures of domination within our society and the issue of mass incarceration is a slice of the pie. I wanted to make that claim because, based on my interactions with some students who previously took this class, as well as a handful of other white liberals, there seem to be some sense that to eliminate mass incarceration is to eradicate racial injustice. I would argue that this is not the case. Here, I would defer to Alexander's invocation of Dr. King, whose sociopolitical ideological stance towards the end of his life recognized the intersection of racial and economic injustice evidenced in the United States and around the world. Contemporarily, as Alexander surely recognizes, the end of mass incarceration does not necessarily  eliminate the circumstances and structure of poverty within the understand that contribute to its existence in the first place. Although limited in his vision, Dr. King was working towards the end of his life towards demanding racial and economic justice for all through the Poor Peoples' Campaign. There are many struggles to advocate for particularly in our society which to some degree appears to become increasingly conscious of injustice, but by no means should we overlook that beyond mass incarceration there is more work awaiting us. As the words of Sweet Honey and the Rock testify, "we who believe in freedom cannot rest until it comes."

White Like Me Conclusion

I would like to use my blog pass from the Rachel Daniel lunch on October 23.

Interrogating Privilege

Most people who attended the Philosophy Conference hosted on Friday went to the first session to hear Megan Craig on philosophy of and through art, with a few (myself included) who were at the second lecture on an experimental philosophy approach to the question: "Did morality evolve?" I cannot speak for the first lecture, but the title and content of this blog are supposed to reflect some of the disconnect I felt with what was said and my own lived experience. By this, I mean that while listening to the carefully crafted words delivered by Dr. Machery (U-Pitt), it felt as I was being pushed toward the Ivory Tower dungeon: to be caged in a level of abstraction removed from the world. What I found striking was a phrase he made during his introductory remarks. To paraphrase, Dr. Machery claimed the following: Because I am a philosopher, whatever I am interested in becomes philosophy.

I want to deconstruct this claim because, as Taylor and others note, racial grammar is an important aspect of how we conceptualize our world and those within it. His words didn't sit well with me. First, it implies, to me, a sense of philosophical entitlement in which he, as a white male, is worthy and what's more, obliged to lift the folds and corners of the universe to discover truth regarding whatever his particular interest happens to be. Dr. Machery’s words remind me of an article we read in a Philosophical Issues and Contemporary African Experience course I took while in Ghana, whose central claim was a call for “conceptual decolonization”: deconstructing the primarily Western conceptual constructions with which non-Western philosophers, by virtue of being philosophers in this world, are required to not only thoroughly understand, but through which they articulate a non-Western reality. But I’m not claiming that Dr. Machery should have just added an adjective before philosophy to clarity; I think there is something deeper at stake here. The earlier statement evokes a sense of boundlessness: philosophically speaking, the world is his. This, then, begs the question by implication: what does this mean in a discipline largely void of non-whites, women, and other minorities? If the philosophy of white men becomes philosophy, then we (including white men) ought to be concerned that this conceptualization of the world and the language we use to articulate our experience within it is severely limited.

This brings me to a second point, more specific to his actual lecture. Admittedly, I am tempted to reduce his topic (“Did morality evolve?”) as little more than philosophical masturbation: a unique emphasis on issues that excite debate, which are utterly removed from the struggle and existence of everyday people, particularly the marginalized and vulnerable. Perhaps this is a prejudice of my own towards a discipline that seems largely to be more concerned with conceptual clarity than it does with the actual subjects it addresses. To Machery’s presentation, his critique was based on the presumptuousness of philosophers in assuming, as a premise, that morality evolved without considering the truthfulness of this assumption in regards to empirical evidence. Two of the three arguments for morality are empirically support and also frequently employed by scientists, while the third is not and most commonly cited by philosophers. However, such a conversation undoubtedly sounds, to me, steeped in privilege—one certainly characteristic of the academic lifestyle. I say that to say this: for example, when I experience racism on this campus or anywhere else, my inclination, even upon reflection, is not to consider whether or not it is true that morality exists; my concern is that within the framework of existing circumstances, someone has acted immorally in such a way that is harmful to my well-being. I find it important to consider the profound contrast between the marginalized and those capable of coming to the conclusion that something like morality is not evolutionary and therefore, those who are marginalized deserve what comes their way. Of course, this is a very crude way of putting it. But it is noteworthy that the debate regarding the Affordable Care Act is not very far off from using a similar language.

Higher Learning

"...we mustn't romanticize our resistance, but fight to maintain its presence in our lives, knowing that it could easily vanish in a moment of weakness, anger, insecurity, or fear" (92).

By now, I assume it is somewhat evident that I prefer to use quotations from the text as my entry point into discussion. The quote above was written by Wise in regards to an incident with his mother in his teenage years when she was intoxicated. After returning home from a Peace Fair, his mother initiated a conversation that gradually descended into her spewing vitriolic of Black people on welfare, and ultimately a personal criticism of her Black colleague. Wise recognizes this moment as significant in his own anti-racist consciousness because in indicates that even those who are perceived as the progressive, Wise's mother in this case, are not and indeed, never will be exempt from the privilege one is afforded.

In addition to a poignant commentary about, generally, the commitment required in being an ally for marginalized peoples, this quote is even more noteworthy in light of recent criticism Tim Wise has recently received himself for ranting on Facebook in a manner that "reflects his own white privilege."

Check it out:
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/the-stream/the-stream-officialblog/2013/9/17/anti-racism-activistgetsbacklashoverrant.html

To paraphrase a quote from James Baldwin, one finds her/himself at war upon becoming conscious of the fallibility of one's own society in promoting injustice and choosing, rather than being complicit, to act morally. However, this is an external conflict that overlooks the internal conflict with the same oppressive forces that have socialized our self-understanding. I believe that Tim Wise recently found himself caught up in this internal conflict, which he openly admitted was "inappropriate." Particularly for those who identify as allies, I think this example offers a sense of support and anxiety: you're going to struggle (although not in the same manner of the marginalized group(s) you advocate for) and inevitably, fail in your attempts to be this ultra-conscious being that has a super-human moral and ethical compass. However, these moments should not instill one with anxiety or sentiments of hopelessness; these are critical moments of learning. What's more, dismantle and deconstruct the pedestals on which you've hosted up others in your life (even Tim Wise)! I think about this often in terms of my own feminism, at moments when I've had men and women claim that "I'm different than other guys." Granted, we may be more or less conscious than others in our advocacy and activism, but that does not make me (or anyone, by implication) exempt from engaging in and subscribing to patriarchal and sexist beliefs, thoughts, actions, practices and institutions. Committing oneself to justice is often accompanied by not only failure to adequately support the oppressed, but also frustration, depression, alienation, and in certain circumstances, even (physically, verbally, emotionally, and spiritually) violent opposition. The value, I believe, in promoting love—because supporting an ethically just and inclusive society is one that places primary importance on a way of being that encourages compassionate empathy with everyone—is understanding that our resistance, far from romanticized, must be contextualized within the historical struggle for justice: the blood, sweat, tears, and life shed by those who were "prisoners of hope" that we might one day be free.

Born To Belonging

Although it is a point raised in the nascent portion of these two chapters, the discussion about ancestry is always one that I find particularly interesting. Wise states, "Even if you don't directly inherit material advantages from your family, there is something empowering about the ability to trace your lineage back hundreds of years, as so many whites but so few persons of color can....The exercise provided, for the whites at least, a sense of pride, even rootedness; not so much for the African American students." This excerpt struck me from the context of my own experience with ancestry. In 1925, African American poet Countee Cullen published a book of poetry, including the well noted "Heritage," which raises the famous inquiry: "What is Africa to me?" Wondering about this question even led, in part, to my study abroad experience in Ghana last year. I kept a journal while there and after visiting Cape Coast and El Mina slave castles, which approaches Wise's discussion about ancestry from a different perspective. So I offer the following, without any critical analysis other than what's already been written:

“Black Americans snapping pictures, as Saidiya Hartman says, is the result of a ‘growing sense of despair and an exhausted political imagination incapable of dreaming of radical change.’ It is this context that I’m fascinated with.   Enslaved Africans, the captives, held in bondage physically, mentally and even spiritually whose descendants, still suffering neo-bondage, neo-slavery, neo-colonialism, seek to capture those very same captives whose legacy they claim, lament and embrace through a narrow lens manufactured and produced by another captive- in this sense, economically- to construct a tangible manifestation of ownership in a world dominated by identities so innately interwoven with a history of inhumane treatment. Staring through the lens, finger poised on the shutter, the captive past meets the present bondage in a dance of self-destruction. Ingrained in this moment for the photographer is the desperate necessity to grapple with feelings of neglect and abandonment, a perpetual inability to simply belong: my seventh grade heritage day in white roman catholic school when I asked my Black gram to make me sweet potato pie because I had no concept of ancestry. Frederick Douglas begins his autobiography with the crushing assertion that he never knew the date of his birth; that is, he could not trace when his existence began in the world. The hopelessness about locating myself in history I felt that day echoed Douglas’ sentiment of having no true beginning. All other students in the class claimed some Irish or Italian ancestry and were basking in the gluttonous consumption of endless containers filled with Irish potatoes. My teacher approached my untouched pie, inquired if it was pumpkin which I denied, and then she walked away without a word. Even the crumbs of identity that tasted sweet to me were valueless in the eyes of the masters as I stood unimpressively alone, worlds apart, on the auction block of heritage.

Western epistemology has taught us that to own is to know. And in that flash, as the pain, anguish, resistance, survival and tragedy we wish to illuminate is bathed in white light, the captive past has once more been enchained within our memories, unbound from the struggles against exploitation and dehumanization fought by those “nimble-fingered” workers one, two, three worlds away. The tyrant ships the finished product, washed clean of the blood, sweat, tears and shit that produced it, only to be burdened with the endless task of toil until the day it dies, to be tossed away- as it is not useless- in an unmarked grave of some invisible land. Yet we are seduced by the scent of hope that this flash will transform the suffering of the past into milk and honey, our promised land-—one in which we belong—cognitively distanced form the cries for human empathy of those unseen, invisible right beneath our nose. Stepping outside the UN World Heritage site, we briefly are blinded by this flash, thinking the dark oppressive stench of history gives way to the sweet enlightenment we've anticipated. But we face instead a city bathed in blood- that red coating lining the bottom of your pant legs- a perpetual reminder of the Black-fleshed Nazarenes who once walked this very soil, whose existence meant suffering in the land of the fishers of men. And within this, we become captive to this scent of hope: addicted to the promise of freedom. Longing that the barriers we have built, demarcating the center from the periphery, being from non-being, existence from nothingness will fade away like a worn photograph whose edges we can only caress and wonder what they once held, yet no longer burdened with the spiritual strife that has defined us. With the click of a shutter, with the gentle embrace of a groove on a dirtied wall, with a deep breath of meditation, we hope to capture their suffering, transcending life itself, exhaling joyously that at least we can embrace the feeling of being home, of belonging ‘with all its promises and dangers, where the stateless at last might thrive.’ And we hang it neatly in our minds as our framework for revolution. 

From Anchor Babies to Obama

Taylor makes many claims in this brief concluding chapter that are worth noting, but I would like to comment on his discussion about the underlying motivation for anti-immigrant sentiments, commonly directed towards Latin(a/o) immigrants:

“anti-immigrant activism is an American tradition, defined, like any other tradition, by proprietary rituals and conventions and rhetoric. And this tradition is constituted in part by ritual genuflections to the whiteness of America and to the dangers of immigrants.”

Considering anti-immigrant activism to be a constitutive element of American tradition might, at first, may elicit resistance to accept such a claim for a few reasons I want to examine. First is the mythology of the “American melting pot”: the belief that immigrant populations have historically arrived on the shores of the United States and shortly thereafter, staked their claim to the American Dream. Yet to consolidate the experiences of various racialized ethnic groups by boiling down their identity to “eventually American” tragically overlooks the resistance faced in their journey to gain naturalization rights—from indigenous Americans to Latin(a/o) immigrants.

Second, let’s consider the oft-cited response that anti-immigrant activism is not uniquely American, but a human inclination: survival of the fittest, if you will, in which we reject populations that do not contribute to the success of the country. This is problematic on many levels! As Taylor cites, it is not even entirely clear that rejecting immigrants make the country stronger. We should be cautious of attempts to sweep targeted emphasis of certain populations, which is in part based on race, under the “human” carpet; we cannot discuss these issues simply on an abstracted human level because not all groups are beginning from the same starting point. Further, rejecting racialized immigrant populations sounds eerily similar to a system of racial control that strives for a problematic sense of purity.

This brings us to a third, broader philosophical argument for rejecting anti-immigrant activism as part of American tradition: such a negative practice cannot legitimately constitute American tradition because culture is necessarily composed of the positive aspects of a people. I first encountered this in a Philosophy course at the University of Ghana. The argument made was that nepotism is not part of Ghanaian culture, but a distortion of it. However, we must consider that the paradoxes—racial and otherwise—which have produced our present context are indeed part of a history we must confront if we ever hope of working towards a more equitable society. Herein lies the significance of Taylor’s comment: we must be explicit and honest that racism and white supremacy have and continue to shape the way that meaning is attributed to bodies and bloodlines, and social goods are distributed. 

The Color Question

*I would like to apply my 4 point credit to last week's blog post please.*

I want to concentrate my post this week on section 5.2.1: Endogamy and the elements of ethics, particularly Taylor's discussion of the "conjugal expressiveness argument" which falls under the category of "strategic endogamy." Strategic endogamy, as Taylor defines it, entails an intentional choice to engage in conjugal relationships. One of the justifications for this practice is identified as the “conjugal expressiveness argument,” which claims that seeing a non-white person with a white partner will perpetuate white supremacist standards of beauty. However, Taylor claims the fifth chapter’s introductory “simple Story” demonstrates that JJ’s insecurity about dating Inga does not necessitate the absolute dominance of “somaesthetic white supremacy”—a psycho-physiological inclination towards white bodies; JJ questions whether his desire to date Inga may be problematic. The crux of problematizing the conjugal expressiveness argument is that “strategic endogamy targets the symptoms instead of the disease, in this case, colorist ideologies of bodily beauty.” Fair enough: emphasizing the individual preference of JJ overlooks the structural implications of somaesthetic white supremacy in the media, fashion industry, etc. Because JJ is, to be direct, of marginal importance in the public sphere compared to say, Jay-Z, then the significance of his choice for a partner is almost negligible (Taylor refers to this as the “role model corollary”). Here, I believe, Taylor offers a weak conclusion, which I will return to soon.
 

Taylor further delegitimizes the conjugal expressiveness argument based on the weakening of “our overall cultural inclination toward a pro-white somaesthetics.” Such instances that indicate its decline include Lucy Liu joining Charlie’s Angels, Black women winning Miss America, collagen-induced plumped lips, and tanning to darken the skin among others—a humorous example of the paradox that comedian Paul Mooney identifies: “everybody wants to be a nigger, but nobody wants to be a nigger.” To be fair, there has been a considerable presence on non-white bodies in historically white dominated industries. Now, what Taylor critically overlooks in his offering of the non-white presence in the celebrity and public sphere globally is the simultaneous reinforcement of pro-white somaesthetics. Famous examples include: (most notably) Michael Jackson, Sammy Sosa, Lil Kim, Nicki Minaj, etc. Skin bleaching creams abound not only outside the United States, but they have also gained popularity within the country as well. I raise these examples not necessarily to disagree with Taylor’s point that such forces are declining in their salience, but to qualify that their existence and perpetuation are real and have noteworthy consequences.

Returning to the relative insignificance of JJ’s desire to be with Inga, we are encountered with Taylor’s conclusion that JJ does not have a right to make a “color-conscious conjugal choice” despite the conjugal expressiveness argument. His solution: he should just have an honest conversation about with the children in his life about his decision. Admittedly, having open racial dialogue with children has proven to be significantly impactful (I am thinking in particular of Drexel Professor Dr. Yaba Blay’s public outreach to a 7 year old sent home from school for having dreadlocks: http://www.clutchmagonline.com/2013/09/tiana-care-package-full-locs-love/). However, if Taylor considers one who opts out of an interracial relationship because he does not want the children to experience the “special challenges” that accompany being bi-racial—which is a consideration of both internal and external ascription factors—permissible then should not a similar exception be granted to JJ’s case? Indeed, JJ’s angst partially refers to the psycho-social pressures of being in an interracial relationship. Does this invalidate the existence of interracial relationships? Of course not! It does, however, recognize that while one may not be ethically obligated to demonstrate color-conscious conjugal choices, the private relationships of “common people” are inextricably public as well. Perhaps not to the degree of Black Philadelphia native rapper, Eve, and her white husband Maximillion Cooper. But to sisters, nieces and nephews, and others he encounters in the street, JJ’s relationship bears racial symbolism, especially contingent on his social class. Although JJ may not be famous, his decision does indeed hold significant racial weight. 

What Races Are

*For the record, I think Taylor has occupied a decent (though not tremendously significant) amount of space talking about his inability to be able to talk about particular topics: just thought the irony was worth noting.*

"...claiming a racial identity may be the first step on a political journey: it may be the beginning or the product of a consciousness-raising experience (116)."

"White people can claim whiteness, people like Noel Ignatiev say, as a way of recognizing the racial privileges that they still enjoy, and as a first step toward disclaiming those privileges, all in the spirit of justice that animated radical abolitionists like John Brown (116)." 

I chose to highlight these particular passages because they illustrate what I perceived as a significant challenge, particularly to the white people in our class. (To clarify, I intentionally spell white with a lower case "w" in an attempt to practice a racial grammar that subverts the dominance of whiteness.) While reading this chapter, I kept wondering why white people felt compelled to join this class, especially those who are not majoring in Philosophy. Granted, this is a liberal arts institution that prides itself on the "diverse" mindsets of its students, who are supposed to be open to exploring fundamental questions about identity, etc. etc. But still the question remains: why this course? 

It is striking, as Taylor illuminates, how pervasively impactful race-thinking continues to be (especially in the United States) from the semantic attribution of meaning to bodies and bloodlines to the interrelated structural distribution of goods along such lines of racialized distinction. It may be noteworthy to speculate why others would intentionally join this class, but I do not have to room to engage in that sort of discussion*. Kidding. My following comments are primarily informed by commentary I have listened to in previous classes as well as reading the blog posts. (Someone could have joined the class because s/he/x is a Philosophy major and had to take a class...but this for my intention is insignificant.) One might join the class quite simply based on a desire to understand more about Race (What is it? Why do we talk about it so often? I have some experiences I think are based on race, could this be true?). Ostensibly simple enough. 

Perhaps someone may have been seeking out affirmation in their own preconceived notions about Race (Well, clearly I know what that is. But just to be sure...); it is a bit presumptuous and condescending, but also not of primary concern here. 

The case that warrants the most unpacking, I believe, is that of the person who chose to join this class perceiving that by doing so, s/he/x has affirmed something about her/him/x-self. Take for example comments such as, "I mean, I don't think any of us here is racist because...you know, other people on campus don't have the opportunity to take a course like this. (abridged from original)" or "I'm from X area, but I was actually going to go to X school because it has a minority dominant population. (altered from original)" These statements all have an underlying theme that sounds at best, steeped in evasion from guilt. I find these statements to be particularly problematic because they express an intentional effort to distance the speaker from being perceived as racist. Couple this with the fact that in a class with thirteen white people, only two were willing to identify themselves as racist, whereas, most were willing to admit to be recipients of structural advantages based on history. (I do not consider the non-white people in this comment because, as I stated, I disagree with Taylor’s frighteningly broad conceptualization of racism.) I note this to make this claim: aversion or refusal to accept that 1) one’s racial identity is informed by the semantic and structural forces of white supremacy and 2) the implications this produces is not working to challenge racism. Returning to the first cited quote from Taylor, actively claiming a racial identity (as well as its tragic and resilient history) is a decidedly political statement—one that may alter one’s self-understanding. So I end this with a challenge to the white people in class to openly, honestly grapple with accepting your racial identity.

**Note: no one is expecting you to raid a federal arsenal and try to bring the “new Jim Crow” to its knees as John Brown attempt; the vast majority of non-white people would not even consider such a feat.**

Three Challenges to Race-Thinking

I want to concentrate this blog primarily on section 2.2.1 of the second chapter and put Taylor's commentary in dialogue with my own from the previous class; Taylor raised a challenge to what he identified as the PPP (indicating racism = Privilege Plus Power) theorist, to which I will respond. Through the questions I have raised in the previous classes, I was hoping to point out that during our discussions we often encounter inconsistency in how we (those in our class) are defining particular terms. For that reason, I am focusing on the first sections of the chapter and returning to a definition I offered in class.

Three challenges to Race-thinking that Taylor considers here are: 1) Isn't race-thinking racist? (ethical inquiry); 2) Isn't racial biology false? (empirical inquiry); 3) Shouldn't the concept of race give way to notions like class? (conceptual inquiry) (28). He shortly thereafter follows the outline with this definition of racism: "an unethical disregard for people who belong to a particular group" (32), from which point he differentiates between extrinsic, intrinsic, and indirect racism. Finally, he offers five primary advantages for using "disregard" to operationalize his definition of racism, given that he admits it cursorily appears to be a rather "weak" term. They are: 1) "disregard" encompasses a broad range of attitudes simultaneously; 2) it maintains focus on ethical evaluation while focusing on the consequences of acts; 3) it also constructs a relationship between institutionalized racism and individual agency; 4) using "disregard" illuminates the moral and ethical impetus in evaluating racism; and 5) it clearly settles questions regarding exactly who/what can be construed as racist (33-4).

In considering certain theoretical positions on racism, Taylor raises a challenge to the PPP argument; those defining racism as the sum of privilege and power, he claims, are actually reductive in their definition of racism by severely narrowing the scope of what may (not) be considered racism. He cites the example of a non-white person that intentionally beats up white people, simply because they are white; Taylor defines this action as racist, however, admits that such actions have relatively low-impact on the spectrum of racism (the trans-Atlantic slave trade obviously occupying a high-impact position). Last class, in an attempt to establish more clarity about the definition of racism in response to Dr. Florka's inquiry (Who in this room is a racist?), I espoused the PPP argument. And admittedly, reading Taylor's critique challenged my thinking, although I am still unsure as to whether conceptualizing racism pluralistically is the most advantageous perspective. To buttress my uncertainty, I would raise the declining percentages recorded of explicit racism (although I do not know whether such data has changed since the election of Barack Obama) as a conceptual limitation to Taylor's understanding. Grouping hate crimes committed by non-white people, which perhaps may be a response, albeit unjustified, to oppression, on white people with the trans-Atlantic slave trade seems too convenient for Taylor's task of defining "Race-thinking." By that, I mean that both occurrences may be drastically different enough, in my opinion, to the extent that they each merit their own spectrum rather than an aggregate consolidation for the sake of conceptual clarity. That being said, at the very least I remain skeptical about Taylor's definition in regards to this contemporary period.

What Race-Thinking Is

"And second, as feminist scholars and other have pointed out for over a hundred years, and as my references to bodybuilding and the like show, human bodies are always already bearers of meaning" (Taylor 16-7)

When I read this quote, particularly the "always already" segment, it brought to mind the work of Judith Butler in relation to gender, but I know it's also associated with Heidegger and Derrida. Taylor elaborates on the idea that human bodies and the conditions in which they exist are "always already" defined by the "semantic" and "structural" racial projects that produce them (Taylor 24). I really appreciated this distinction because I think it brought to life the dual impact of race-talk/thinking in our everyday lives in that: 1) it informs how we conceptualize the world around us and 2) it is also informed by the conditions under which it has taken shape. There's an organization in Philadelphia that I'm affiliated with called "The Brothers' Network," which seeks to challenge dominant narratives about African American men through dialogue in arts and culture. One day, I was having a conversation with the founder and he made a statement that I think illustrates the two points about race talk/thinking; he said (something to the effect) that he could not imagine living a life in which he did not have to fight or struggle because of how tremendously impactful slavery and its aftermath have been. And it made me pause. Being told in each pre-dominantly white space I occupied that I did not fit the stereotypical mold of being Black; I'm "just different"; or I don't "act Black enough;" those times when I notice white salespeople following me around stores, regardless of my attire; and being told that it's good because I don't seem to angry, even though I talk about race. And all these instances are derived from the origins of Omi and Winant's concept of racial formation- "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed" (Taylor 24). I think a resounding point in this introduction is Taylor's emphasis on why engage race philosophically: precisely because as inhabitants of this country, our orientation to each other in a racialized society necessitates that we understand race although, like Zarita, we may not have the language to articulate our experience...just yet, that is.